

The President's Daily Brief

27 September 1971

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Top Secret

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in Communist China is discussed on Page 1.

The Chinese are trying to reassure the North Vietnamese that Peking will not loose sight of Hanoi's interests in talks with the US. (Page 3)

Soviets	e 4)	50X
	hnev and Tito's joint s	tatement
Britain	USSR	50X1
Japanese officials	(Page 6) are worried about growi	ng politi-

COMMUNIST CHINA

Press reports state that preparations for low- key celebrations of National Day on 1 October are going forward in Peking's parks				
security measures in the city are relaxed. Despite the air of calm, behind-the-scenes tension within the politburo apparently re-		50X1 50X1		
mains high.		50X1		
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There is no new information on the status of Mao's health, but the absence of any official reaction from Peking to growing press speculation about the fate of heir-designate Lin Piao suggests that uncertainty over Lin's physical condition, or perhaps his political role, may be a crucial factor				
in the leadership crisis.	7	50X1		

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50X1 50X1 50X1 the traditional National Day banquet hosted by Chou would be held as scheduled on 30 September. This event may not shed any light on Mao's or Lin's status because neither usually attends. Although the decision to hold this affair probably is intended to convey an impression of normalcy, postponement of other scheduled activities suggests that the regime anticipates no early resolution of the crisis. A statement by Foreign Ministry officials that all foreign 50X1 businessmen have been instructed "to depart China" may be an indication that the regime also plans to postpone or cancel the Canton Trade Fair, scheduled to open on 15 October.

The almost total suspension of military air-craft flight activity is continuing into the third week. There are indications that ground force units in Tibet continue to be on special alert, but there is still no confirmation that such activity is nationwide.


NORTH VIETNAM - CHINA

The current visit to Hanoi by a Chinese politburo delegation is primarily designed to assuage Vietnamese apprehensions that the Chinese might try to mediate the war with the US. Ostensibly the visit is that of a routine aid mission, but it also gets the Chinese point of view into Hanoi more than a week prior to the arrival of Soviet President Podgorny.

The Chinese initiative--sending politburo member Li Hsien-nien and his aid team to Hanoi rather than having the Vietnamese come to Peking--suggests that more than the annual aid protocol is involved. The Vietnamese are responding in kind; they are referring to the delegation as one of "friendship," comparing it to Chou En-lai's visit last March, and are highlighting Chinese support for Hanoi's war aims rather than Peking's material aid.

The tenor of Li's banquet speech on 24 September was especially pleasing to Hanoi ears. He engaged in the kind of harsh denunciation of US motives that Hanoi is currently using, characterizing US imperialism as the "most ferocious enemy of our times" and criticizing Washington for making "noises about a peaceful settlement while continuing its war of aggression" in Indochina. Li also offered unqualified support for Hanoi's negotiating posture and reassured the Vietnamese that the destiny of Indochina would indeed be decided by the "peoples of the three Indochinese countries."

The Li visit may put to rest Vietnamese anxieties generated by the announcement that President Nixon had been invited to Peking. For about a month after the announcement, Hanoi engaged in unprecedented polemical lecturing of the Chinese, accusing them of consorting with the enemy, abandoning friends, and not being true revolutionaries. These attacks stopped on 22 August as suddenly as they had begun, and since mid-September the Vietnamese have been deliberately avoiding public criticism of Peking.



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-YUGOSLAVIA

Brezhnev and Tito issued a joint statement Saturday agreeing to improve relations. They promised more cooperation between their Communist parties, a step that could reverse a situation in which there were few fruitful contacts in recent years. Their statement also called for more governmental and economic collaboration. Both made an implied pledge to end polemical criticism of the

The Yugoslavs received recognition of their right to experiment in political and economic reform as well as a long-sought Soviet agreement to reciprocity in information programs conducted in the other's country. In practice, reciprocity could mean a sharp diminution of the USSR's propaganda effort in Yugoslavia.

Both sides agreed to ease tensions in the Balkans, and Brezhnev conceded that a nuclear-free zone in the area "could be" a means of stabilizing peace there. This noncommital position falls short of the Yugoslav desire that the Soviets renounce the use of force in the Balkans. The statement contained a reference to earlier Soviet-Yugoslav declarations of intent to end their differences and guarantee Yugoslav sovereignty dating back to 1955, but this formula did not satisfy Tito's desire for a specific Soviet promise to keep hands off his country.

Because neither Brezhnev nor Tito changed their basic positions, it is doubtful that either side will interpret the provisions of their joint statement to the full satisfaction of the other. However, when compared to recent tensions between the two, relations should improve for a while, at least on the surface. Tito will accept the respite for what it is, but his worries about Moscow's ultimate intentions in the Balkans will remain.

Following the visit Brezhnev flew to Budapest to brief Hungarian leaders on the talks. Yesterday he arrived in Sofia to make a similar report. Hungary and Bulgaria aided the USSR's effort to keep pressure on Yugoslavia this summer.

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JAPAN

Saturday's demonstration at the imperial palace is but the latest example of how the use of violence is replacing more traditional forms of ritualistic protest among radical Japanese youth and students. It was the first forcible intrusion by students in modern times onto the well-guarded grounds. Other leftist groups are said to be preparing further demonstrations against Emperor Hirohito's trip abroad.

The police are expecting massive protests after the Diet convenes in mid-October to consider the Okinawa agreement. They are particularly worried by evidence that guns and explosives are in the hands of established radical youth organizations, and no longer restricted to a tiny lunatic fringe of the youth movement. Officials fear that the larger organizations might use such weapons during the coming mass demonstrations in order to trigger widespread violence.

Any such spread of violence could readily compound the Sato government's anticipated difficulties with the Diet over the issues of the Okinawa treaty and relations with China.

NOTE

USSR: The top leaders are continuing to add new destinations to their itineraries for this fall. TASS has announced that President Podgorny will visit India and Burma on his way to Hanoi; he will stop in Rangoon on 2 October. Premier Kosygin is said to have added Morocco to his schedule, possibly between visits to Algeria and Iran early next month. The US Embassy in Ottawa has received a number of hints that Kosygin may be interested in a visit to the UN and perhaps meetings with the "highest" US officials during or after his stay in Canada from 17 to 27 October.